

Photography and Philosophy

Essays on the Pencil
of Nature

Edited by Scott Walden

Photography and Philosophy

New Directions in Aesthetics

Series editors: Dominic McIver Lopes, University of British Columbia,
and Berys Gaut, University of St Andrews

Blackwell's New Directions in Aesthetics series highlights ambitious single- and multiple-author books that confront the most intriguing and pressing problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of art today. Each book is written in a way that advances understanding of the subject at hand and is accessible to upper-undergraduate and graduate students.

1. **Robert Stecker** *Interpretation and Construction: Art, Speech, and the Law*
2. **David Davies** *Art as Performance*
3. **Peter Kivy** *The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature*
4. **James R. Hamilton** *The Art of Theater*
5. **Scott Walden, ed.** *Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature*
6. **James O. Young** *Cultural Appropriation and the Arts*

Forthcoming

7. **Garry Hagberg, ed.** *Art and Ethical Criticism*

Photography and Philosophy

Essays on the Pencil
of Nature

Edited by Scott Walden

© 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

BLACKWELL PUBLISHING

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK

550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia

The right of Scott Walden to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks, or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

First published 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1 2008

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Photography and philosophy : essays on the pencil of nature / edited by Scott Walden.
p. cm. — (New directions in aesthetics)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4051-3924-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Photography—Philosophy.

2. Photography, Artistic—Philosophy. I. Walden, Scott, 1961–

TR183.P483 2007

770.1—dc22

2007024737

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

Set in 10/12.5pt Galliard

by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong

Printed and bound in Singapore

by C.O.S. Printers Pte Ltd

The publisher's policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards.

For further information on

Blackwell Publishing, visit our website at

www.blackwellpublishing.com

CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	vii
<i>List of Figures</i>	viii
<i>Contributors</i>	x
Introduction <i>Scott Walden</i>	1
1 Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism <i>Kendall L. Walton</i>	14
2 Photographs and Icons <i>Cynthia Freeland</i>	50
3 Photographs as Evidence <i>Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Cohen</i>	70
4 Truth in Photography <i>Scott Walden</i>	91
5 Documentary Authority and the Art of Photography <i>Barbara Savedoff</i>	111
6 Photography and Representation <i>Roger Scruton</i>	138
7 How Photographs “Signify”: Cartier-Bresson’s “Reply” to Scruton <i>David Davies</i>	167

8	Scales of Space and Time in Photography: “Perception Points Two Ways” <i>Patrick Maynard</i>	187
9	True Appreciation <i>Dominic McIver Lopes</i>	210
10	Landscape and Still Life: Static Representations of Static Scenes <i>Kendall L. Walton</i>	231
11	The Problem with Movie Stars <i>Noël Carroll</i>	248
12	Pictures of King Arthur: Photography and the Power of Narrative <i>Gregory Currie</i>	265
13	The Naked Truth <i>Arthur C. Danto</i>	284
	Epilogue	309
	<i>Bibliography</i>	310
	<i>Index</i>	318

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This anthology emerges from the *Light Symposium*, a conference on photography co-sponsored by the Memorial University of Newfoundland and the Art Gallery of Newfoundland and Labrador. The efforts of many members of these two institutions went into the creation of the intellectually and aesthetically satisfying atmosphere that the participants enjoyed, but special thanks are due to William Barker, Patricia Grattan, Bruce Johnson, and John Scott. Financial support for the conference from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is also gratefully acknowledged.

Two residences administered by the Art Gallery of Newfoundland and Labrador (and assisted by the Landfall Trust and Terra Nova National Park) provided me with time to write this introductory essay, my own essay, and to attend to the myriad details involved in assembling this volume. Special thanks in connection with this are due to Gordon Laurin and Shauna McCabe. Debbie Bula and Anupum Mehrotra, with the Philosophy Department at New York University, were stellar in helping me with a variety of administrative matters. My thanks as well to Danielle Descoteaux, Jamie Harlan, and Jeff Dean at Blackwell Publishing for a mixture of warmth and professionalism that made pulling this collection together so enjoyable.

Personal thanks are due to John Maturri for many conversations over the years, and to Gary Ostertag for planting the idea for this collection in my mind many years ago, and for his unending support and encouragement. Finally, my thanks to Christine Downie for fueling the entire project with her limitless love.

Scott Walden
New York

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1	Francisco Goya y Lucientes, <i>Tanto y más</i> (All this and more); Fatales consecuencias de la sangrienta guerra en Espana con Buonaparte	16
Figure 1.2	Timothy H. O'Sullivan, <i>Incidents of the War. A Harvest of Death</i> , Gettysburg, July, 1863	17
Figure 1.3	Chuck Close, <i>Big Self Portrait</i> , 1967–8	28
Figure 1.4	John DeAndrea, <i>Man With Arms Around Woman</i> , 1976	30
Figure 1.5	Douglas Bond, <i>Ace I</i> , 1967	31
Figure 1.6	André Kertész, <i>Distortion #157</i> , 1933	32
Figure 1.7	Jerry Uelsmann, <i>Symbolic Mutation</i> , 1961	43
Figure 4.1	Rackstraw Downes, <i>Snug Harbor, Ductwork Under the Music Hall</i> , 2000	102
Figure 5.1	Anonymous, 20th century, <i>A Wedding</i>	114
Figure 5.2	Margaret Bourke-White, <i>Louisville Flood Victims</i> , 1937	115
Figure 5.3	Henri Cartier-Bresson, <i>Valencia</i> , Spain, 1933	118
Figure 5.4	Minor White, <i>Capitol Reef</i> , Utah, 1962	120
Figure 5.5	Aaron Siskind, <i>Chicago</i> , 1949	122
Figure 5.6	Clarence John Laughlin, <i>Our Festering Hands Ruin All . . .</i> , 1949	124
Figure 5.7	Carl Chiarenza, <i>Untitled Triptych 195/190/188</i> , 1994	128
Figure 5.8	Vik Muniz, <i>Valentina, the Fastest</i> , (from Sugar Children) 1996	130
Figure 5.9	Chuck Close, <i>Self Portrait/Composite/Sixteen Parts</i> , 1987	132

Figure 7.1	Henri Cartier-Bresson, <i>Abruzzi, Village of Aquila</i> , 1951	184
Figure 8.1	Patrick Maynard, <i>Unsure</i> , 2005	188
Figure 8.2	Patrick Maynard, <i>Unsure</i> (uncropped)	200
Figure 8.3	Patrick Maynard, <i>Robert</i> , 2005	204
Figure 9.1	Photographer unknown, <i>J. P. Morgan at Society Wedding Dodging the Camera</i> , 1937	217
Figure 10.1	Peter Paul Rubens, <i>An Autumn Landscape with a View of Het Steen in the Early Morning</i> (probably 1636)	232
Figure 10.2	Kendall L. Walton, <i>Mount Geryon</i>	234
Figure 10.3	Jacques Henri Lartigue, <i>Grand Prix of the Automobile Club of France</i> , 1913	236
Figure 10.4	Francesco Antoniani, <i>Marina in burrasca</i> , c. 1770	237
Figure 10.5	Page 111 from <i>Understanding Comics</i> by Scott McCloud, 1993, 1994	238
Figure 10.6	Marcel Duchamp, <i>Nude Descending a Staircase</i> , 1912 (no. 2)	240
Figure 10.7	Joseph de Saint-Quentin, J.-P. <i>Vue de la place Louis XV</i>	246
Figure 12.1	Julia Margaret Cameron, <i>The May Queen</i> , 1874	270
Figure 13.1	Peter Hujar, <i>Candy Darling on her Deathbed</i> , 1974	297
Figure 14.1	<i>Make-Believe Mariner</i> , Kendall L. Walton and Patrick Maynard at Cape Spear, Newfoundland, September 2002	309

CONTRIBUTORS

Noël Carroll is the author or editor of multiple books and dozens of articles on a wide range of humanistic and cultural topics. In 2002, Carroll was awarded a Guggenheim fellowship to explore the relationship between philosophy and dance. He is currently Andrew W. Mellon Term Professor in the Humanities at Temple University.

Jonathan Cohen has published numerous essays in a variety of fields, including the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and aesthetics. He is co-editor of *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind* (Blackwell Publishing, 2007) and *Color Ontology and Color Science* (The MIT Press, forthcoming). Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Gregory Currie has published numerous books and articles on the arts generally, with special emphasis on cinema and narrative. His most recent works include: *Narrative Thinking* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming), *Arts and Minds* (Oxford University Press, 2005), and *Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology* (Oxford University Press, 2002). Currie is Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Nottingham.

Arthur Danto's numerous books and essays cover topics ranging from the philosophy of Hegel to debates in contemporary art. He is art critic for *The Nation* and contributing editor for several prominent periodicals, including *Artforum* and *Naked Punch Review*. Danto is Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus) at Columbia University.

David Davies works primarily in the philosophy of art, and has published articles on film, literature, and the visual arts. He has also published widely

on issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. His book *Art as Performance* (Blackwell, 2004) clarifies the continuities and discontinuities between traditional and contemporary art. Davies is Associate Professor in the department of Philosophy at McGill University.

Cynthia Freeland is the author of *But Is It Art? An Introduction to Art Theory* (Oxford University Press, 2002) and co-editor of *Philosophy and Film* (Routledge, 1995). In addition to her curatorial work and critical writing on photography, Freeland is Professor and Chairperson in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Houston.

Dominic Lopes has co-edited several books and published numerous essays on the philosophy of art. He is author of *Understanding Pictures* (Oxford University Press, 1996) and *Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures* (Oxford University Press, 2005). Lopes is Distinguished University Scholar and Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia.

Patrick Maynard's numerous essays on the arts generally and photography in particular are richly informed by art-historical knowledge. He is author of *The Engine of Visualization: Thinking Through Photography* (Cornell University Press, 1997) and *Drawing Distinctions: The Varieties of Graphic Expression* (Cornell University Press, 2005). Maynard is Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus) at the University of Western Ontario.

Aaron Meskin's research in the philosophy of art and philosophical psychology has led to the publication of numerous essays, including 'Defining Comics?' (*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 2007) and 'Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn From Others About Beauty and Art?' (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2004). He is Lecturer and Director of Postgraduate Studies with the Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds.

Barbara Savedoff has published numerous essays on the philosophy of photography and is author of the influential *Transforming Images: How Photography Complicates the Picture* (Cornell University Press, 2000). In addition to her practice as a painter, Savedoff is Associate Professor of Philosophy, Baruch College, City University of New York.

Roger Scruton is a philosopher, journalist, composer, and broadcaster who has published more than 30 books of criticism, philosophy, and cultural commentary. He was Fellow of Peterhouse Cambridge and Director

of Studies at Christ's College Cambridge from 1971 until 1991, and is currently Visiting Professor with the Department of Philosophy, University of Buckingham.

Scott Walden specializes in the theory and practice of photography. He has received multiple grants from the Canada Council for the Arts, and was awarded the 2007 Duke and Duchess of York Prize in Photography. He is currently Visiting Scholar with the Department of Philosophy, New York University.

Kendall L. Walton has published dozens of highly influential essays on the philosophy of art and representation, and is author of *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Harvard University Press, 1990). He has been awarded fellowships from, among other organizations, the Rockefeller Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the American Council of Learned Societies. Walton is Charles L. Stevenson Collegiate Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan.

INTRODUCTION

Scott Walden

Photography received an enormous amount of critical attention during the 1970s and '80s. Roland Barthes provided a poignant meditation on the phenomenology of viewing photographs, and then a more analytical investigation into the nature of photographic meaning.¹ Susan Sontag undertook a sustained examination of the role of photography in the media, focusing especially on the limits of the medium in fostering ethical knowledge.² Allan Sekula worked to undermine the traditional idea that there is something especially truthful or objective about a photographic image, or that it carried a unique, context-invariant meaning.³ And Joel Snyder argued against the modernist idea that there were principles of evaluation unique to photography, ones that set such evaluation apart from the evaluation of images generally.⁴ Texts by these authors still constitute the canon in college courses devoted to photographic theory.

But much has changed since these books and articles were published. There have been developments in the philosophies of language and depiction which have advanced our understanding of text-meaning and image-meaning. Digital-imaging technology and the image-manipulation possibilities it affords have replaced the traditional negative-positive

¹ Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (New York: Noonday Press, 1981); and Roland Barthes, "The Photographic Message," in *Image/Music/Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1977), and in excerpt form at pp. 521–33, in Vicki Goldberg, ed., *Photography in Print: Writings from 1816 to the Present* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981).

² Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1977).

³ Allan Sekula, *Photography Against the Grain: Essays and Photo Works 1973–1983* (Halifax, NS: The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1984).

⁴ Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen, "Photography, Vision, and Representation," *Critical Inquiry* 2 (1975).

process, raising new questions about the veracity of the medium. In the artworld, photography has changed from a marginal medium fighting for institutional respect to one that not only has its own department at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, but has become the darling of the avant-garde as well. And there has been an increase in our awareness of the need for specialized attention to ethical issues arising in professions that involve human subjects such as medicine and business, a development that raises the possibility of a similar need in the professional practice of photography. Given these developments the time is right for a re-investigation of the themes the pioneering critics introduced, and for a careful examination of the new issues that have arisen.

Most of the essays presented here are thus newly written for this collection, although in three instances I have chosen to reprint already published works that bring fresh perspectives to these issues or that have been especially influential on the other works in the collection. Kendall L. Walton's first contribution, "Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism," is one such reprint. Walton takes as his conceptual starting point the idea that photographs are produced by a *mechanical* process, one that bypasses the beliefs the photographer has about the scene before her. The photographer's belief that there is a tree in front of her, for example, operating in conjunction with her desire to take a picture of a tree, might cause her to point her camera straight ahead, but once she trips the shutter it is the optical-chemical (or, these days, optical-electronic) process that renders the image, not any aspect of the contents of her mind. With a handmade image such as a painting matters are different – the beliefs a painter has about the scene before him are directly involved in what gets rendered on the canvas.

Walton's second and most controversial idea is that the mechanical character of the photographic process makes photographs, quite literally, *transparent*. We see through them to their subject matter in the same way we see through windows to the things that lie on the other side. Handmade images such as paintings or drawings, because they have beliefs directly involved in their formative process, are, by contrast, opaque. We may *imagine* that they are transparent and that we see through them, but in fact we do not.

According to Walton, two additional features emerge from these twin claims of mechanicity and transparency. The first is that the transparent character of photographs places viewers in special *contact* with the things seen through them, and that from such contact arises value. If a photograph of Beethoven were discovered, we would literally see the great composer through it, and we would thereby be in special contact with him.

Such contact – and the value we associate with it – accounts for the media frenzy that most certainly would result. The second feature is that the mechanical-transparent character of the photographic process yields images that are especially helpful in enabling people to learn about the world by looking through them. This *epistemic advantage* accounts for the usefulness of photographs in journalistic, evidentiary, and scientific contexts.

Cynthia Freeland's contribution (chapter 2) focuses on Walton's contact and transparency theses. With regard to the former, Freeland investigates the extent to which photographs function like religious icons. Icons of holy figures are said to function not as representations of their subjects, but rather as *manifestations* of them and, as such, are said to afford special contact with those subjects. Furthermore, many icons are thought to have a special causal connection with their subjects, either having been rendered by someone who was actually in the presence of the holy figure or, in certain instances, having been rendered without human agency at all (by physical contact with the subject, or by divine agency). Perhaps the manifestation function of icons arises from these special causal connections, and perhaps such manifestation accounts for the sense of contact that icons are said to afford. Likewise, perhaps photographs in some sense manifest their subjects, and perhaps such manifestation arises from the mechanical character of the photographic process. If so, the analogy with icons might help us further to understand the sense of contact with the world that photographs seem to offer.

With regard to Walton's transparency thesis, Freeland notes that Walton distinguishes between seeing something directly in ordinary vision and seeing something indirectly by means of visual aids such as binoculars, telescopes, and photographs. Freeland suggests that it is typically the former kind of seeing that places us in contact with the things we see, and that the latter kind might not afford contact at all. Given this, she wonders whether there is a tension within Walton's position insofar as he is arguing that the transparency of photographs supports their capacity to convey a sense of contact with their subjects, even though the kind of seeing that occurs through them is indirect.

In chapter 3, Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Cohen refine a line of criticism of Walton's transparency thesis which they began in an earlier essay.⁵ Contact with the world is an instance of seeing, they argue, only if such contact provides information about the visual properties of things (v-information) *and* information about the spatial locations of those

⁵ Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, "On the Epistemic Value of Photographs," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62: 2 (Spring 2004): 197–210.

things in relation to the body of the viewer (e-information). While perceptual contact via a photograph might be a rich source of v-information, it is almost never a source of e-information. I can, for example, learn about the visible properties of the Eiffel Tower by looking at a photograph of it, but I cannot learn in what direction it lies relative to me by doing so (except, perhaps, in very unusual cases such as those in which my body is also depicted). Thus we do not see through photographs; they are not transparent.

Meskin and Cohen further argue that the special evidentiary status we accord individual photographs arises from the beliefs we have about photographs in general. As members of a society which regularly uses photographs in journalistic, evidentiary, and scientific contexts, we each develop the belief that photographs as a category are rich sources of v-information. Thus, when we encounter an object which we recognize as a photograph, we infer that it, as a member of this category, is a rich source of v-information. In contrast, as members of a society in which paintings and drawings are typically *not* used in contexts where v-information about things depicted is in demand, we each develop the belief that such images (again, as a category) are poor sources of such information. Thus, when we encounter an object which we recognize as a painting or a drawing – even one that aspires to photorealism – we tend to infer that it is not a rich source of v-information (even though, unbeknownst to us, it might be). Such background beliefs about these two broad categories of images, Meskin and Cohen suggest, in this way account for the special epistemic weight frequently accorded to photographs.

My own contribution (chapter 4) investigates the claims of veracity or objectivity that have been associated with photography since its invention, but that are these days regarded with suspicion. In exactly what senses might photographs be especially truthful or impartial in comparison to handmade images? Why is it that we continue to use photographic images in contexts that require these qualities (such as journalistic or evidentiary) notwithstanding the contemporary suspicions? And what bearing does the advent of digital imaging have on these issues?

I argue first of all that the notions of truth and objectivity must be detached from one another. Truth is a quality associated not with images themselves, but rather with the thoughts those images engender in the minds of their viewers. Objectivity is likewise not a quality belonging to the images themselves, but then again nor is it a quality belonging to the thoughts those images engender. Instead, objectivity is equivalent to Walton's notion of mechanicity and, as such, is a quality belonging to the *process* that begins with the original scene and ends in the formation of the image. I argue

further that thoughts arising from viewing objectively formed images may or may not be true, but that *if* those thoughts are true, then the viewer can have greater *confidence* in their truth than he or she would have had had the images been subjectively formed. This loose linkage between truth and objectivity (and the tight connection between objectivity and mechanistic) opens the possibility that digital imaging leaves the veracity of thoughts formed by looking at photographic images unscathed, but takes away the viewer's confidence in the truth of such thoughts. And this would be unfortunate, as it has been recognized at least since Plato's *Meno* that it is much less valuable to have true thoughts than it is to have true thoughts *plus* grounds for confidence in their truth.

Barbara Savedoff is likewise interested in the truth or objectivity associated with photographic images, qualities she refers to under the heading of *documentary authority* (chapter 5). In an earlier work, Savedoff explained how our assumptions about the documentary authority of photographic images is a key ingredient in our appreciation of a range of important photographs from the fine-art canon.⁶ Here, she applies her analysis to images belonging to the relatively unusual genres of abstract or surrealist photography. With regard to abstract photographs, Savedoff argues that our assumptions about documentary authority cause us to attempt to identify the objects that were before the camera when the photograph was taken, attempts which are in tension with the abstract qualities of the photograph itself. Such a tension has a positive effect, one that causes our appreciation of abstract photographs to differ importantly from our appreciation of abstract paintings or drawings (in which no similar assumptions about authority are operative). With regard to surrealist photographs, Savedoff argues that assumptions about documentary authority are likewise in play, although in these instances it is not *resisted* attempts at recognition that enhance the appreciation, but rather *successful* acts of recognition of familiar objects presented in uncanny ways.

Savedoff also considers a range of images that in various ways function to undermine our confidence in the documentary authority of photographic images generally, and wonders whether the recent widespread dissemination of such images will cause viewers to abandon their assumptions about the documentary authority of photographs, with the result that we will no longer be able to appreciate abstract or surrealist photographs in the traditional ways.

⁶ Barbara Savedoff, *Transforming Images: How Photography Complicates the Picture*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Roger Scruton's essay (chapter 6) has been the subject of heated critical attention since its initial publication in 1983. Its central thesis – that images yielded by photographic means cannot be artworks except insofar as they incorporate formative elements foreign to the photographic process – runs counter to the dramatic increase in the acceptance of photographs as artworks noted above. Scruton's central argument is straightforward:

- 1 An object is a work of visual art only if it is a representation.
- 2 An image is a representation only if it expresses the artist's thoughts or feelings about what is depicted.
- 3 Such expression is facilitated by the artist's control over details in an image, and the viewer's subsequent questioning why the details are arranged in the ways that they are.
- 4 The photographer lacks such control over details (the photographic process is, as noted, a mechanical one), and so the images produced cannot be representations, and so cannot be works of art.

Suppose, for example, that a portrait painter chooses pigments that render her sitter slightly luminescent. The attentive viewer might then ask why the artists chose to render the sitter in this way, and in answering this question might conclude that the artist regards the sitter as angelic. The image would in this way be a representation, something that conveys the artist's thoughts or feelings to the viewer. Now consider a photographic portrait. Details in a photographic portrait are the product of the mechanical operation of the camera, not the conscious control of the photographer. The viewer, knowing about this lack of control, is *not* motivated to ask why the details are as they are, and so has no means of discerning the attitudes of the photographer towards her subject. The photograph is thus not a representation, and so cannot be an artwork. Granted, the photographic image could be retouched using airbrush or (these days) digital-imaging techniques and that the control requisite for expression could thereby be introduced, but to the extent that such techniques are incorporated, the photographer becomes, essentially, a painter, and Scruton has no quarrel with the idea that *paintings* can be artworks.

One way of responding to Scruton involves denying his claim that an object can be a work of visual art only if the artist has sufficient control over its details. Examples such as Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades (in which found objects – a urinal, most infamously – are placed in galleries and declared artworks) do seem to run directly counter to this thesis. Another way would be to reject Scruton's construal of representation as being overly restrictive. Or a third way might involve granting both of these to Scruton (at least for the sake of argument) but then arguing that

photographers do indeed have the requisite control over details in the images they produce. David Davies takes this third approach in his contribution to our collection (chapter 7).

Davies begins by placing Scruton's discussion in historical context, noting that Rudolph Arnheim, writing almost 50 years before Scruton, considered and responded to the same sort of argument that Scruton presents (indeed, Arnheim himself is responding to Scruton-style arguments offered by both Charles Baudelaire and Lady Elizabeth Eastlake in the 1850s⁷). Arnheim agrees that there are many details in a photographic image that are beyond the control of the photographer, but points out that *how* the subject is presented – from which direction, using which camera angle, etc. – constitutes enough control over the image to enable it to express the photographer's thoughts. Davies supplements Arnheim's "response" to Scruton by carefully considering both a photograph by Henri Cartier-Bresson and that photographer's own discussion of his work. Cartier-Bresson's masterpiece, *Abruzzi, Village of Aquila* (1951) [figure 7.1], exemplifies rigorous geometrical structure, a structure which Cartier-Bresson sees as expressing the significance that he finds in the world. For Cartier-Bresson, events in the world acquire such significance by their relations to one another, and the photographer's awareness of this significance is expressed by his or her incorporation of relational geometrical structure in the photographic images he or she produces. The control over detail needed for expression is thus found not only in choice of subject matter and camera angle, as suggested by Arnheim, but by the incorporation of geometrical structure in a photographic image as well.

Patrick Maynard, like Davies, finds much of the value in many photographs in compositional matters such as geometrical form, but dramatically expands the range of such matters considered and, accordingly, augments the vocabulary used in doing so. According to Maynard (chapter 8), in creating a successful photograph the photographer uses her highly developed sense of the spatial scales, dynamics, and rhythms in the scene before her to structure the image she produces. The developed eye of the photographer might, for example, enable her to see the dynamics created by two human figures moving in opposite directions, and might therefore arrange things so that these figures are placed at opposite edges of the photograph, thereby creating a balanced tension that can serve as a backdrop for other, more localized, tensions nearer the center of the image.

⁷ See Charles Baudelaire, "The Salon of 1859," and Lady Elizabeth Eastlake, "A Review in *The London Quarterly Review*," in Goldberg, *Photography in Print*, pp. 123–6 and 88–99 respectively.

The sophisticated viewer, for his part, understands the image to be an artifact, and in so doing asks why objects are placed in the ways that they are, and in answering such questions both connects with the photographer insofar as he understands what she was able to see, and enhances his own powers of visual discernment in ways that will be of value on future occasions of seeing. For Maynard, the value of creating and viewing images lies both in their ability to embody the photographer's sophisticated ways of seeing *and* in their ability to further develop the ways of seeing of their attentive viewers.

Dominic Lopes is similarly interested in value, although he approaches the topic via a preliminary investigation into the nature of appreciation (chapter 9). Does adequate appreciation require true beliefs about the things being appreciated? If so, what aspects of these things must the appreciator have true beliefs about? Three options are considered:

- (i) the adequate appreciator must be correct in believing that the thing being appreciated is of a certain kind, although she may have beliefs inconsistent with the actual nature of that kind;
- (ii) the adequate appreciator must not have beliefs inconsistent with the actual nature of the kind to which she believes the thing being appreciated belongs, although she might be incorrect about whether that thing really belongs to that kind;
- (iii) the adequate appreciator must both be correct in believing that the thing being appreciated is of a certain kind *and* not have beliefs inconsistent with the actual nature of that kind.

For example, suppose I am appreciating Andy Warhol's *Brillo Boxes*, but I am appreciating it as an instance of traditional mimetic art, not as an instance of pop art. I marvel at how realistic his depictions of actual, store-bought Brillo boxes are (although I am a bit taken aback by his choice of subject matter that goes beyond the usual landscape or portraiture). Am I appreciating *Brillo Boxes* adequately? If we take the first option, the answer is "no," since the work is an instance of pop art, not mimetic art. If we take the second option and assume that I understand mimetic art – or, at least, that I do not have beliefs that conflict with the essence of such art – then the answer is "yes," since on this option my mis-categorization is irrelevant to the quality of my appreciation. If we take the third option, then the answer is "no," since it requires satisfaction of the first.

Lopes leaves open the question which of these options best accounts for our intuitions concerning the circumstances under which someone is appreciating well. But he does note that which we choose might have significant bearing on whether, in general, we appreciate photographs

adequately. The danger lies in accepting either options (ii) or (iii) and then, in addition, accepting contemporary suspicions about the veracity of the medium. For suppose the widespread belief that photographs furnish the truth is false. If so, then appreciators of photographs typically have a belief that is inconsistent with the actual nature of photography. If this is the case, then on options (ii) or (iii) they are not appreciating photographs well. Could it be that, unbeknownst to us, there is something fundamentally wrong with our appreciation of core examples from the canon of nineteenth- and twentieth-century photography?

Kendall L. Walton's second contribution to our collection, "Landscape and Still Life: Static Representations of Static Scenes," investigates the differences in the depictive contents of still and motion-picture images.⁸ Walton bases his investigation on a theory of depiction he has presented elsewhere, certain core features of which must be understood in order to follow the line of reasoning found in his essay.⁹ According to Walton, the depictive content of an image is a matter of what one is prompted to *imagine* oneself seeing when one views the image. In looking at Rubens's *An Autumn Landscape with a View of Het Steen in the Early Morning* (1636?) [figure 10.1], for example, among other things I imagine that I see trees and fields, a horse-cart and a hunter, clouds in the background, buildings, etc. It is the content of such imaginings that constitute the *depictive* content of the image. Such imaginings often occur as part of larger networks of imaginings that are not unlike the networks which constitute children's games of make-believe. In the same way a group of children might agree to imagine that tree stumps in a forest are bears and that, therefore, in encountering a particular stump, they are mandated to imagine that it is a bear, in viewing the Rubens and imagining that I am seeing a cart and a hunter, I am mandated to further imagine that the cart has recently crossed the river, that the hunter has recently shot his quarry, that he will soon shoot more, etc. According to Walton's view, this network of mandated imaginings constitutes the *representational* content of the image.

⁸ Walton's topic is thus not photography exclusively, since many still images are non-photographic, and it is conceivable (see chapter 10) that there are motion pictures that are likewise non-photographic. It is an interesting additional question how Walton's discussion here intersects with his view – presented in his first contribution to this anthology (chapter 1) – that photographic and non-photographic images differ in terms of their transparency.

⁹ *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

Furthermore, Walton's notion of imagination is quite different from imagining in our ordinary sense of the term. Ordinary imagining involves the formation of mental images. If I am asked to imagine that the Eiffel Tower is in New York I might create an image in my mind in which the tower is next to the Empire State Building, or one in which the tower is on the edge of Central Park, etc. Imagining in Walton's sense, however, requires no such mental imagery. Instead, such states are representational insofar as they have *propositional contents*, contents that can be true or false. Imaginings in Walton's sense are thus similar to beliefs. I can imagine that four is a prime number (say, as part of a mathematical investigation) or I can believe that four is a prime number (say, on the basis poor instruction) – in both cases the state would be representational insofar as it is false, but in neither case would a mental image be required.

Turning now to Walton's essay, suppose that a five-minute film is made of an unchanging scene and then projected for an audience. Suppose further that a slide is made of the same unchanging scene, and then projected for the audience, again for five minutes. Assuming both projections are in color, that they are equally sharp, that there is no image-shake in the motion-picture projection, etc., the images cast on the screen will be indiscernible. And yet the temporal depictive content of the two images may well be different. It is clear that the film depicts five minutes in the history of the unchanging scene, but what does the five-minute projection of the still image depict? Does our knowledge that the slide projection is a still photograph prompt us to imagine that we see the unchanging scene for a dimensionless instant? Does it prompt us to imagine that we see the scene for the length of time we examine the image itself? These puzzling questions arise from consideration only of the depictive content of still photographs; there remains the larger question of their representational content.

In chapter 11, Noël Carroll examines two ways in which a fiction-film audience can utilize their knowledge of the real world in the course of understanding the film they are viewing. The first, which he calls the *realistic heuristic*, involves assuming that the fictional world of the film operates as much like the real world as is possible consonant with the plot and genre-specific assumptions embodied in that particular film. For example, in viewing a western the audience knows that a hero dangling from a cliff will die if he loses his grip and falls to the ground (because in the real world people falling from great heights die), but at the same time accepts his super-human ability to haul his body to safety (because it is part of the western genre that the hero never dies).

A second way in which knowledge of the real world is brought to bear is much less direct. Fiction films can in various ways *allude* to aspects of the world beyond the film, including other films with which the audience can be expected to be familiar. One form such allusion takes involves using a well-known actor in a fresh role, so that the audience has the *twofold* experience of recognizing a familiar face (and thus bringing to bear their dossier of knowledge about that actor's previous roles) and yet at the same time seeing that actor as the new character embedded in the narrative of the film at hand. In his later films John Wayne takes on the personas of various new characters, but all such personas, Carroll notes, are allusively informed by the audience's knowledge of Wayne's many previous roles.

Carroll conjectures that the photographic process is an aid to such allusive techniques. Because a photographic depiction (either still or motion-picture) is always wedded in the first instance to the actual person before the camera, the audience's attention will always be directed in part to the actor himself or herself, and thus to his or her life beyond the particular film being viewed. Such divided attention will typically enrich the audience's experience of the new character, however, in much the same way that allusion to matters beyond a story presented in a work of literature – allusions to the Catholic Mass in Joyce's *Ulysses*, for example – can be used to add extra dimensions to the characters portrayed therein.

Gregory Currie, in chapter 12, likewise investigates the extent to which the photographic process engenders such twofold experience, although in Currie's case the emphasis is on the extent to which such experience is rendered dissonant – rather than enriched – by its twofold character.

Currie distinguishes between two fundamentally different ways in which things can represent. *Representation by origin* weds the depictive content of an image to an object or person that figured in some way in its etiology. For example, a portrait made with Queen Elizabeth as the sitter represents-by-origin Queen Elizabeth because it was she who was the sitter; likewise, a photograph made with Queen Elizabeth in front of the camera at the moment of exposure represents-by-origin Queen Elizabeth because it was she who was in front of the camera at that moment. *Representation by use*, by way of contrast, finds some means *other* than etiological of determining depictive content – a salt-shaker, for example, might come to represent Queen Elizabeth, not by having any causal connection with her, but rather by being used (perhaps along with some other dinnerware) to demonstrate on a kitchen table her movements at a ceremony.

An image can simultaneously represent-by-origin and represent-by-use. Julia Margaret Cameron's photographic illustrations of Tennyson's Arthurian poems, in which she photographed her friends dressed in clothes appropriate to the characters in the narrative, represent-by-origin those friends, and yet at the same time represent-by-use the various Arthurian characters. One danger of such dual representation is that dissonance can arise between the two depictive contents, and Currie finds Cameron's illustrations problematic for precisely this reason. In the case of the image entitled *The May Queen* [figure 12.1], the salience of the origin-based content (her friend Emily Peacock) is not overridden by the use-based content (the May Queen) formed by the meager narrative supported by the image. Consequently, the viewer is torn between experiencing the image as being of Peacock, and experiencing it as being of the May Queen.

Such dissonance, however, need not always occur. The rich narrative frequently supported by film results in use-based contents (referring to the characters in the narrative) that are much more salient to viewers than the origin-based contents (referring to the individual actors and their lives outside of the narrative) fixed by the photographic basis of the medium. This is one of the most prominent respects in which the aesthetics of still photography can differ from that of motion-picture photography.

Given that many, if not most, photographs involve human subjects, it is surprising that there has been no extended treatment of the ethical terrain surrounding the use of the medium. In chapter 13, Arthur Danto takes a significant step in developing such a literature by focusing on the ethics of photographic portraiture. He begins by revisiting the ancient distinction between the world as it appears to us and the world as it really is. Historically, philosophers have placed dramatically greater value on the reality lying behind the appearances, and have prided themselves on their (alleged) special ability to discern it. In a reversal of this tradition, Danto argues that there is value in appearances, and especially appearances as projected by individual human beings. Part of what it is to be human, he notes, is to care about how we appear to each other – the thriving fashion, cosmetic, hairstyling, and fitness industries all stand testament to this. Given that we value our appearances, these images we project to other members of our community ought to be respected, and one facet of such respect is an obligation on the part of the portrait-maker to depict individuals in ways that convey this desired projection, or at least in ways that do not conflict with it.

The danger with photography, however, is that the camera is not unlike the traditional philosopher in that it has the ability to pierce the veil of appearances and depict the reality lying behind. High-speed shutters, for

example, enable depictions of those facial expressions that lie between the smiles, frowns, and winks that we ordinarily discern in one another, allowing for depictions of the real but unflattering arrangements of facial musculature that take place during ordinary speech (examples of this can easily be seen by pressing the pause button on one's computer while viewing footage of a person speaking). Danto refers to such appearance-piercing portraits as *stills*, and contrasts them with what he calls *natural drawings*, photographs that depict their subjects in ways consonant with normal human perception.

The discussion leads to a range of issues ripe for further investigation. Is an individual's desired appearance always to be respected, or would such a demand lead only to portraits that appeal to the vanity of their subjects? Street photography as practiced by Robert Frank, Lee Friedlander, and Garry Winogrand, or candid portraiture of friends and lovers as practiced by Nan Goldin, often depict their subjects in unflattering ways. Is such work – which includes many of the finest photographs of the previous century – to be condemned on ethical grounds?

I

TRANSPARENT PICTURES: ON THE NATURE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC REALISM

Kendall L. Walton

Photography and the cinema . . . satisfy, once and for all and in its very essence, our obsession with realism.

The photographic image is the object itself.

André Bazin, "The Ontology of the Photographic Image"

Every photograph is a fake from start to finish.

Edward Steichen, "Ye Fakers"

I

Photographs and pictures of other kinds have various strengths and weaknesses. But photography is commonly thought to excel in one dimension especially, that of *realism*. André Bazin and many others consider photographs to be extraordinarily realistic, realistic in a way or to an extent which is beyond the reach of paintings, drawings, and other "handmade" pictures.

This attitude is encouraged by a rich assortment of familiar observations. Photographs of a crime are more likely to be admitted as evidence in court than paintings or drawings are. Some courts allow reporters to sketch their proceedings but not to photograph them. Photographs are more useful for extortion; a sketch of Mr. X in bed with Mrs. Y – even a full-color oil painting – would cause little consternation. Photographic

pornography is more potent than the painted variety. Published photographs of disaster victims or the private lives of public figures understandably provoke charges of invasion of privacy; similar complaints against the publication of drawings or paintings have less credibility. I expect that most of us will acknowledge that, in general, photographs and paintings (and comparable nonphotographic pictures) affect us very differently. Compare Francisco Goya's etchings *The Disasters of War* with the Civil War photographs by Mathew Brady and his associates (see, for example, figures 1.1 and 1.2). It is hard to resist describing the difference by saying that the photographs have a kind of immediacy or realism which the etchings lack. (This is not to deny that the etchings might equal or surpass the photographs in realism of some other sort, and it is certainly not to claim that the photographs are better.)

That photography is a supremely realistic medium may be the common-sense view, but – as Edward Steichen reminds us – it is by no means universal. Dissenters note how unlike reality a photograph is and how unlikely we are to confuse the one with the other. They point to “distortions” engendered by the photographic process and to the control which the photographer exercises over the finished product, the opportunities he enjoys for interpretation and falsification. Many emphasize the expressive nature of the medium, observing that photographs are inevitably colored by the photographer's personal interests, attitudes, and prejudices.¹ Whether any of these various considerations really does collide with photography's claim of extraordinary realism depends, of course, on how that claim is to be understood.

Those who find photographs especially realistic sometimes think of photography as a further advance in a direction which many picture makers have taken during the last several centuries, as a continuation or culmination of the post-Renaissance quest for realism.² There is some truth in this. Such earlier advances toward realism include the development of perspective and modeling techniques, the portrayal of ordinary and incidental details, attention to the effects of light, and so on. From its very beginning, photography mastered perspective (*a* system of perspective

¹ Perhaps the best recent defense of this dissenting view is that of Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen, “Photography, Vision, and Representation,” *Critical Inquiry* 2 (Autumn, 1975): 143–69; all further references to this work, abbreviated “PVR,” will be included in the text.

² See André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in *What Is Cinema?* trans. Hugh Gray, vol. 1 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 12; all further references to this work, abbreviated “OPI,” will be included in the text. See also Rudolf Arnheim, “Melancholy Unshaped,” in *Toward a Psychology of Art: Collected Essays* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 186.



Figure 1.1 Francisco Goya y Lucientes, *Tanto y más* (All this and more); Fatales consecuencias de la sangrienta guerra en Espana con Buonaparte. Y otros caprichos enfáticos [Disasters of War], plate 22 Photograph © 2007 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.



Figure 1.2 Timothy H. O'Sullivan, *Incidents of the War. A Harvest of Death*, Gettysburg, July, 1863. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Civil War Photographs, LC B8184 7964.

that works, anyway, if not the only one). Subtleties of shading, gradations of brightness nearly impossible to achieve with the brush, became commonplace. Photographs include as a matter of course the most mundane details of the scenes they portray – stray chickens, facial warts, clutters of dirty dishes. Photographic images easily can seem to be what painters striving for realism have always been after.

But “photographic realism” is not very special if this is all there is to it: photographs merely enjoy *more* of something which other pictures possess in smaller quantities. These differences of degree, moreover, are not differences between photographs *as such* and paintings and drawings *as such*. Paintings *can* be as realistic as the most realistic photographs, if realism resides in subtleties of shading, skillful perspective, and so forth; some indeed are virtually indistinguishable from photographs. When a painter fails to achieve such realism up to photographic standards, the difficulty is merely technological, one which, in principle, can be overcome – by more attention to details, more skill with the brush, a better grasp of the “rules of perspective.” Likewise, photographs aren’t necessarily very realistic in these sort of ways. Some are blurred and badly exposed. Perspective “distortions” can be introduced and subtleties of shading eliminated by choice of lens or manipulation of contrast. Photographic realism is not essentially unavailable to the painter, it seems, nor are photographs automatically endowed with it. It is just easier to achieve with the camera than with the brush.

Bazin and others see a much deeper gap between photographs and pictures of other kinds. This is evident from the marvelously exotic pronouncements they have sometimes resorted to in attempting to characterize the difference. Bazin’s claim that the photographic image is identical with the object photographed is no isolated anomaly. He elaborates it at considerable length; it is echoed by Christian Metz; and it has resonances in the writings of many others.³

³ Here is more from Bazin:

Only a photographic lens can give us the kind of image of the object that is capable of satisfying the deep need man has to substitute for it something more than a mere approximation, a kind of decal or transfer. The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. [“OPI,” p. 14]

The photograph as such and the object in itself share a common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint. Wherefore, photography actually contributes something in the order of natural creation instead of providing a substitute for it. [“OPI,” p. 15]

And see Christian Metz, *Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema*, trans. Michael Taylor (New York, 1974); “The cinema is the “phenomenological” art *par excellence*, the signifier is coextensive with the whole of the significate, the spectacle its own signification, thus short-circuiting the sign itself” (p. 43).

Such wild allegations might well be dismissed out of hand. It is simply and obviously false that a photographic image of Half Dome, for example, *is* Half Dome. Perhaps we shouldn't interpret Bazin's words literally.⁴ But there is no readily apparent nonliteral reading of them on which they are even plausible. Is Bazin describing what seems to the viewer to be the case rather than what actually is the case? Is he saying that, in looking at photographs, one has the impression, is under an illusion, of actually seeing the world, that a photographic image of Half Dome appears to be Half Dome?

There is no such illusion. Only in the most exotic circumstances would one mistake a photograph for the objects photographed. The flatness of photographs, their frames, the walls on which they are hung are virtually always obvious and unmistakable. Still photographs of moving objects are motionless. Many photographs are black-and-white. Even photographic motion pictures in "living color" are manifestly mere projections on a flat surface and easily distinguished from "reality." Photographs look like what they are: *photographs*.

Does our experience of a photograph *approach* that of having an illusion more closely than our experiences of paintings do, even though not closely enough to qualify as an illusion? Possibly. But this is not what Bazin means. If it were, theater would qualify as even more realistic than photography. Theater comes as close or closer to providing genuine illusions than film does, it would seem. There are real flesh-and-blood

The claim that the photographic image is identical with the object photographed has resonances in Helmut Gernsheim's observation that "the camera intercepts images, the paintbrush reconstructs them" (quoted by Charles Barr, "Cinemascope: Before and After," in *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*, ed. Gerald Mast and Marshall Cohen, 2d ed. [New York, 1979], p. 141); in Erwin Panofsky's dictum "The medium of the movies is physical reality as such" ("Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures," in *Film Theory and Criticism*, p. 263); and in the frequent characterization of photographs as "duplicates" or "doubles" or "reproductions" or "substitutes" or "surrogates" (see, e.g., Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation," *Critical Inquiry* 7 [Spring 1981]: 577-603; repr. in this volume, chapter 6).

⁴ Stanley Cavell prefers not to take Bazin and Panofsky literally. The truth in what they say, he suggests, is that "a photograph is *of* the world" ("of reality or nature"), whereas "[a] painting *is* a world." In explanation, he observes that one "can always ask, of an area photographed, what lies adjacent to that area, beyond the frame. This generally makes no sense asked of a painting" (*The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film*, enlarged ed. [Cambridge, MA, 1979], pp. 24, 16, 24, 23). But photographs typically have their own (fictional) worlds, as do paintings. And since paintings frequently portray actual scenes, they, like photographs, are often of the real world. We *can* ask, concerning a painting of an actual scene as well as a photograph, what there is in reality outside the portion depicted. Indeed we can also ask, in both cases, what the fictional world is like beyond the frame. Smoke within a frame may indicate (fictional) fire outside it.

persons on stage, and they look more like the people portrayed than do plays of light and dark on a flat screen. But Bazin regards the fact that photographs are produced “mechanically” as crucial to their special realism – and theatrical portrayals are not produced “mechanically” (see “OPI,” pp. 12 and 14). (Erwin Panofsky explicitly contrasts film with theater, as well as with painting.)⁵

Bazin seems to hold that photographs enjoy their special status just by virtue of being photographs, by virtue of their mechanical origins, regardless of what they look like. “No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the [photographic] image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model” (“OPI,” p. 15).

To add to the confusion, let us note that claims strikingly similar to Bazin’s observations about photography, and equally paradoxical, have been made concerning painting and other “handmade” representations, the very things Bazin and others mean to be distinguishing photography from!

When we point to [a painted] image and say “this is a man” [s]trictly speaking that statement may be interpreted to mean that the image itself is a member of the class “man”. . . . [A stick which a child calls a horse] becomes a horse in its own right, it belongs in the class of “gee-gees” and may even merit a proper name of its own.⁶

[A wooden robin poised on a bird-feeding station] does not say: Such is a robin! It *is* a robin, although a somewhat incomplete one. It adds a robin to the inventory of nature, just as in Madame Tussaud’s Exhibition the uniformed guards, made of wax, are . . . intended . . . to weirdly increase the staff of the institution.⁷

What, then, is special about photography?

There is one clear difference between photography and painting. A photograph is always a photograph of something which actually exists. Even when photographs portray such nonentities as werewolves and Martians, they are nonetheless photographs of actual things: actors, stage sets, costumes. Paintings needn’t picture actual things. A painting of Aphrodite, executed without the use of a model, depicts nothing real.⁸ But this is by no means the whole story. Those who see a sharp contrast between photographs

⁵ See Panofsky, “Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures,” pp. 248 and 260.

⁶ E. H. Gombrich, “Meditations on a Hobby Horse or the Roots of Artistic Form,” in *“Meditations on a Hobby Horse,” and Other Essays on the Theory of Art* (London, 1963), p. 2.

⁷ Arnheim, “The Robin and the Saint,” in *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 325.

⁸ See Scruton, “Photography and Representation,” p. 579, and this volume, pp. 139–40.